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Abstract 
This paper explores theoretically the implications of bank market structure and banking system risks 
concentration for the functioning of interbank markets. It employs a simple model where banks are 
exposed to both credit and liquidity risk, there is no asymmetric information, no market power, no 
friction in secondary markets and deposit contracts are fully contingent. We show that (a) the 
concentration of risks induced by changes in bank market structure makes interbank market 
breakdowns more likely; (b) welfare monotonically decreases in risk concentration; and (c) risk 
concentration and a high probability of interbank market breakdowns can be driven by risk control 
diseconomies of scale and scope and increases in financial firms’ size. As banking systems become 
more concentrated, improvement of risk control technologies in financial institutions and in regulatory 
bodies appear as important as other policies considered in the literature to minimize the probability of 
interbank market breakdowns. 
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1 
“Evidence suggests that [risk] interdependencies between large and complex banking 
organisations have increased over the last decade in the United States and Japan, and are 
beginning to do so in Europe. Although a causal link has not been established, these increases are 
positively correlated with measures of consolidation. Areas of increased interdependency that are 
most associated with consolidation include interbank loans, market activities such as OTC 
derivatives, and payment and settlement systems.” 
Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, January 2001 
I. Introduction
* 
One prominent feature of the recent financial crisis has been the disruption and prolonged 
malfunctioning of interbank markets. This has come as a surprise to most observers, since interbank 
markets have been functioning smoothly historically, even in the face of severe stress episodes such as 
the LTCM failure (Furfine, 2000).  
Recent theoretical research addressing why interbank markets may not function properly has 
provided explanations based on: asymmetric information (e.g. Flannery, 1996, Freixas and Jorge, 
2008, Heider et al., 2008); market power (e.g. Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2008, and Cai and 
Thakor, 2008); malfunctioning secondary asset markets (e.g. Gorton and Huang, 2004 and 2006, and 
Diamond and Rajan, 2005 and 2008). An exception is Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009), who show that 
the incompleteness of markets can be at the root of the breakdown of interbank markets’ during 
periods of stress. In their model, such incompleteness arises only from the absence of tradable state 
contingent securities and from the use of debt contracts modeled with no state-contingency, since 
there is no asymmetric information, no market power and secondary asset markets function smoothly. 
Their results can be viewed as showing that asymmetric information, market power, and dysfunctional 
secondary asset markets are not necessary, although they are sufficient, for interbank markets 
breakdowns.  
Since the Group of Ten study cited above, however, there has been increasing evidence of a 
positive relationship between systemic risk in major banking systems and bank concentration, as well 
as evidence of increases in systemic risk associated with changes in bank market structure.
 1 This 
evidence raises the question of whether changes in bank market structure could have a significant 
impact on the functioning of interbank markets, and if so, why. To our knowledge, this question has 
not been addressed in the literature.  
In this paper we explore the implications of banking system risk concentration for the functioning 
of interbank markets. This is accomplished by building a simple model along the lines of Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) and Battacharya and Gale (1987) models. Differing from these papers and from 
that of Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009), banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk, there is no 
asymmetric information, markets are perfectly competitive, there is no friction in secondary markets. 
Importantly banks offer fully contingent debt contracts to their financiers/depositors, and use interbank 
markets to smooth their credit and liquidity shocks.  
                                                      
*  I thank without implications Gianni De Nicolò, Florian Heider, Marie Hoerova, Cornelia Holthausen, Philipp Hartmann, 
Jose-Luis Peydro, Loriana Pelizzon, Bruno Maria Parigi, Maurizio Murgia, Goetz Von Peter, Kostas Tsatsaronis and 
seminar participants at the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the University of Bozen, University 
of Venice and the Bank for International Settlements for comments and suggestions. (First draft: September 29, 2009. 
This draft: July 8, 2010) 
1  Evidence on the positive relationship between bank concentration and measures of bank systemic risk is in Boyd, De 
Nicolò and Loukoianova (2009) and Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal (2009). During the 1990s and early 2000s, De Nicolò and 
Kwast (2002) found increased risk interdependencies among U.S. large and complex banking organizations. Risk profiles 
of large and complex U.S. and European banks were also found to have increased in the U.S. in Europe, and globally in 
De Nicolò et al (2004), De Nicolò, Hayward, and Vir Bhatia (2004), Stiroh (2004), Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries 
(2005), Stiroh and Rumble (2006), and Houston and Stiroh (2006).  Marcella Lucchetta 
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We show that an increase in the concentration of risks— possibly arising from concentrated market 
structure—makes interbank markets breakdowns more likely. Differing from the previous literature, 
our results are not driven by asymmetric information, market power, dysfunctional secondary markets 
or contracts incompleteness, rather they can be explained by risk control diseconomies associated with 
large sizes of financial institutions and the wide scope and complexity of their activities. Indeed, large 
and complex banking groups (LCBG) are seen as institutions to be carefully monitored by regulator as 
a potential source of instabilities (ECB Financial Stability Review, December 2009).
 2  Problems 
related to the functioning of the interbank markets and the attitude of banks to merge to solve the 
liquidity needs is highlighted in Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo (2007) who show that mergers 
aimed at raising liquidity may also increase the concentration of risks. 
In section II we describe the model. The model set-up captures in stylized form an important 
distinction is made between diversification of a banking firm and diversification of the financial 
system along the lines of De Nicolò and Kwast (2002). Banks can be perfectly diversified 
individually, but aggregate risk in the banking system can be either perfectly diversified or 
concentrated across banks. As the system becomes composed of fewer and larger banks, each bank 
will be more diversified individually, but the banking system will be less diversified, since a larger 
fraction of banks is exposed to the same aggregate shocks. In the model, the degree of banking system 
diversification is parameterized between the two extremes of perfect diversification and maximal 
concentration.  
Section III defines the interbank equilibrium. Interbank market breakdowns are simply defined as 
situations in which the interbank equilibrium does not exist and is replaced by the autarkic 
equilibrium, where each bank is disconnected from each other.  
In section IV, existence of interbank equilibriums is established for the two extreme cases of a 
perfectly diversified and a maximally concentrated banking system. Then, it is shown that for a large 
set of economies, the size of the set of interbank equilibriums under a diversified banking system is 
always strictly larger than that of a concentrated banking system for any level of credit and liquidity 
risk. This result indicates that in the presence of aggregate risk, a diversified banking system is likely 
to be less prone to interbank market breakdowns.  
Section V defines the welfare properties of interbank and autarkic allocations. When an interbank 
equilibrium exists, it clearly gives a higher expected utility to depositors than the autarkic equilibrium, 
but importantly, agents’ welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of risk concentration. 
Section VI provides an explanation of why banks may choose risk so that a banking system may 
take on concentrated risk. Risk concentration and a high probability of interbank market breakdowns 
may be due to risk control diseconomies of scale and scope arising within large and complex financial 
firms.  
Our explanation is technological, although it can be easily complemented by all other explanatory 
factors emphasized in the literature. Specifically, we show that when our model is modified by 
introducing a risk control technology with decreasing returns over a certain investment threshold, then 
banks will choose a level of risk concentration that increases in size. Such level is higher the larger is 
the cost of risk control arising from the internal organization of large and complex firms. This result 
suggests improvement of risk control technologies in large and complex financial institutions and in 
regulatory bodies may be policy concerns as important as other polices considered in the literature to 
minimize the probability of interbank market breakdowns.  
Section V concludes. Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.  
                                                      
2  In a related contribution, Hartmann, Carletti and Spagnolo (2007) examine the impact of changes in bank market 
structure on the distribution of liquidity shocks and the recourse to interbank markets. Unlike this paper, however, they 
assume that the interbank rate is exogenous and, therefore, there are no breakdowns.  
 Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
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II. The Model 
There are three periods, t = 0,1,2 , and one risky asset that yields a random return at date 2 per unit 
invested at date 0. It can assume two values,  R = R
h , and R = R
l . If a portion of the investment in 
this asset is liquidated att =1, it yields a certain return of λ  per unit invested. The fraction of the 
asset that is liquidated is denotedα . It is assumed that 1
hl RR λ >> ≥  so that if storage is available, 
this technology will be dominated in rate of return in both dates and will be never used.  
At date 0 consumers are endowed with one unit of the date 0 consumption good, which is assumed 
to be invested all in one bank. Consumers are uncertain about their time preferences: with probability 
μ they are early consumers, who want to consume at date 1 only, and with probability  1− μ  they are 
late consumers, who want to consume at date 2 only.  
Their preferences are represented by a utility functionU(c), twice continuously differentiable, 
increasing, and strictly concave. The fraction of early consumers is also random and can assume two 
values: μ = μ
h , and 
l μ μ = , with10
hl μμ >>> .  
The banking sector is composed of a continuum of banks that invest consumer’s endowments at 
date 0. The banking sector is perfectly competitive, so that banks’ objective is to maximize depositors’ 
expected utility.  
Each bank is exposed to liquidity and credit risk shocks. The realization of both shocks is observed 
by a bank at date 1. We assume there is no aggregate uncertainty, so that the fraction of banks which is 
exposed to a given combination of credit and liquidity shocks is deterministic. However, the 
probabilities (and hence the distribution) of these banks at date 0 depends on an exogenous parameter 
(0,1) σ ∈ that defines the market structure with respect to the concentration of liquidity and credit risk 
in the banking system.  
Specifically, the fraction of banks that experience a given pair of realizations of credit and liquidity 
risk (,) R μ  is given by the following table, where  (0,1) p∈  and (0,1) q∈ :  
Re \
(1 )
















Thereafter we refer to parameter σ  as an index of “market structure”.  
A fraction of banks  p σ  (type 1) experiences a low liquidity shock and a high final date return on 
the asset; by contrast, a fraction of banks  (1 ) p σ − (type 4) experiences the reverse, that is, a high 
liquidity shock and a low final date return on the asset. Thus, credit risks and liquidity risks are 
perfectly positively correlated for type 1 and 4 banks.  
Conversely, a fraction of banks (1 )q σ −  (type 2) experiences a high liquidity shock but also a high 
final date return on the asset, whereas a fraction of banks (1 )(1 ) q σ − − ( type 3) a low liquidity shock 
but also a low final date return on the asset. Thus, credit risk and liquidity risks are perfectly negatively 
correlated for type 2 and 3 banks.. 
The exogenous parameter  (0,1) σ ∈  indexes the degree of concentration of liquidity and credit 
risk in the banking system. If 0 σ = , then the banking system is made of banks that have chosen to 
diversify their credit and liquidity risks, while if 1 σ = , banks have chosen to concentrate their credit Marcella Lucchetta 
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and liquidity risks. As σ increases, the banking system exhibits a higher concentration of risks for any 
given values of(,) p q . This can be the result either of consolidation and/or incentives for banks to 
take on correlated risks. 
III. Interbank Equilibrium 
Here, we examine how well an interbank market works for a given market structure.  
There is an interbank market where liquidity can be traded at the intermediate date. The amount of 
funds that each bank trade in the interbank market is denoted b and the interbank rate is denoted byr .  
At date 1, competitive banks maximize the expected utility of depositors. They choose the amount 
of borrowing b  (if positive, borrowing, if negative, lending) and the amount of asset to liquidate, α , 
to solve:  
  11 2 , ()( 1 )()
b Ma x Uc Uc
α μ μ Π= + −       (1) 
Subject to  
  1 cb μ αλ = +        (2) 
2 (1 ) (1 ) cR r b μ α −= − −  (3), 
where r is the “interbank” rate, to be determined in the  1 t =  credit equilibrium.  
Assume and interbank equilibrium exists. Substituting (3) in (2) throughb ,  
 
2




μ μα λ α +− = + −  (4). 
The solution 
* α  will be the one that makes the bank’s budget constraint the largest, i.e. that makes the 
right hand side of (4) the largest. Hence, the solution is given by:  
* 0 α = if 
R
r
λ >  and  
* 1 α =        if
R
r
λ <    (5).  












⎠ ⎟ (6). 
This is because if   r ≤ R
l / λ , by (4) all banks will not liquidate the investment in the risky technology, 
and by (2) they will wish to finance all date 1 consumption by borrowing. Thus, there would be no 
lenders, hence no interbank equilibrium. Likewise, ifr ≥ R
h / λ , by (5) all banks will liquidate the 
investment in the risky technology, and by (3) they will wish to finance all date 2 consumption by the 
repayments on lending at date 2. But at date 1 there would be no borrowers, hence no interbank 
equilibrium.  Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
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⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +− −
Π= + − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (1a), 








⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +− − ′′ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (7). 
Thus, the solution of the bank problem is given by (5) and (7). Note that banks optimal choices are the 
liquidation decision
*() R α , which does not depend onμ , and (,) bRμ . The liquidation decision in 
response to the credit risk realization does not depend on the liquidity shock (in (5) nothing depends 
onμ ), but the borrowing decision depends on both shocks (by (7)).  
We characterize equilibriums for log utility preferences, i.e. () l n () Uc c = . The choice of this 
specification is motivated by simplicity and by the fact that for these preferences, date 1 spot market 
allocations and optimal banking allocations generally coincide in liquidity preference frameworks 
such as ours (see Allen and Gale 2007). Hence, these preferences can be viewed as a useful 
benchmark to judge differences in equilibriums and associated welfare properties in diversified and 
concentrated risk economies, as these comparisons are unlikely to be affected by efficiency wedges 
between market and banking allocations.  












Solving (8), we have 
  ()
** 1
(,) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) bR R r
r
μ μα μ α λ =− − − (9). 
Since   r ∈(R
l / λ,R
h / λ) , by (5), optimal asset’s liquidation is 
*()1
l R α = and
*()0
h R α = .  
In sum, the four bank types have the following borrowing/lending positions 
 (,) ( 1 )
ll l bR μ μλ =− − (9a) 
 (, ) ( 1 )




hl l h bR R
r




hh h h bR R
r
μμ = (9d), 
and equilibrium in the interbank market requires  
11
(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 0
lh hh l h pR qR q p
rr
σμ σ μ σ μ λ σ μ λ +− −− − − − − − =(10). Marcella Lucchetta 
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The above equation (10) is linear with respect to r and has the unique solution:  
( ) * (1 )












Equation (11) says that the interbank equilibrium rate raises as the liquidity needs and the opportunity 
cost of holding the asset, R
h , increase. 
IV. Comparisons of Equilibriums 
In this section we identify conditions ensuring existence of equilibriums for the extreme values ofσ , 
and compare the set of parameters for which equilibriums exists for such values.  



















  (12). 
We use (12) to assess the existence of interbank equilibriums under two extreme cases, that of banking 
system’s perfect diversification ( 0 σ = ), and that of maximal risk concentration in the banking system 
( 1 σ = ). The main result is summarized in the following proposition.  
Proposition 1. For the perfect diversified economy ( 0 σ = ) and for the perfect concentrated 
economy ( 1 σ = ), the set of interbank equilibriums is non-empty for any parameter configuration of 
credit and liquidity risk(,,,)
hlhl R R μμ . 
Now, we wish to compare the size  of the set of economies, indexed by  p  andq, for which 
equilibriums exist for  0 σ = and for  1 σ = . 











































−+ ⎢⎥ +− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 (14). 
The larger is the interval for which equilibriums exists under diversification or concentration, the 
larger is the set of economies that may benefit from the risk sharing opportunities offered by the 
interbank market.  
Consider the difference between the equilibriums interval when  0 σ = and when 1 σ = , defined as:  













































−+ + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (17). 
Of particular interest is the comparison of the set of equilibriums for relatively large credit and 
liquidity shocks. This comparison is made clearer by substituting
hl μ γμ = , where 1/μ
l ≥ γ ≥1, and 
lh R R β = where 1 β ≤ . Parameter γ is a measure of the liquidity risk and  β is the credit risk. The 
smaller is β , the larger is the difference between high and low return. The larger is γ , the larger is 
the difference between low and high liquidity shock.  
Thus, (15) can be expressed as 
 
() ()
(1 ) (1 )
(, ,)
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
ll l l
l
ll l l lll l G
γμ μ μ γμ
μγβ
γμ μ γμ β μ γμ μ μ β γμ
−−
=−
+− +− −+ +−
   (18). 
The following proposition establishes a ranking of the size of equilibriums under a diversified 
economy and a risk-concentrated economy.  
Proposition 2. There exists a 
l μ such that for 
ll μ μ ≥ and any (, ) γ β  the set of interbank 
equilibrium under the diversified economy is always strictly larger than for the concentrated economy. 
When liquidity shocks are large, the diversified economy has interbank equilibriums for a larger set 
of economies than the risk-concentrated economy. In other words, when shocks are large, the 
interbank equilibrium breaks down if the banking structure exhibits concentration of risks. Therefore, 
a diversified economy offers a better insurance against high liquidity and credit risk. Finally note that 
by (18), for  1 β γ == , which amounts to absence of credit and liquidity risk,  (1,1) 0 G = , then the 
two sets are equivalent. This means that bank market structure is important especially when the shocks 
are high.  
Figure 1 shows graphically the result of proposition 2 for a set of economies. The surface 
representing the function  (, ,)
l G μ γβ is increasing in liquidity risk.  Marcella Lucchetta 
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Figure 1. Behavior of  (, ,)
l G μ γβ 
 
As figure 1 highlights, the set of equilibriums is increasing in the degree of banks’ risk diversification 
for a liquidity risk greater that 
l μ . This indicates that an interbank is less likely to break-down when 
the economy is more diversified.  
V. Welfare Comparisons 
We want to compare agents’ welfare in economies with banking systems differing according to market 
structure. To do that, we compute depositors’ expected utility.  




















Substituting equilibrium values α ,  b and  r in (19) and (20), we obtain the consumption allocation 
offered by different bank types,    C
type(i) = (c1
type(i),c2
type(i)) for  1, 2,3, 4 i = :  Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
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σμ σ μ λ
σμ σ μ
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −−− + −− ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ =
⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
   (21a) 
 









σμ σ μ λ
σμ σ μ
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −−− + −− ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ =
⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
(21b) 
  ( ) (3) (1 )
,












⎜⎟ −−− + −− ⎝⎠
(21c) 
  ( ) (4) (1 )
,












⎜⎟ −−− + −− ⎝⎠
(21d). 
The ex-ante the expected utility of a representative consumer is therefore  
 
4( ) ( )
11 2 (( ) ) ( , )
type i type i
i WP t y p e i U c c = ≡∑  for  1,2,3,4 i =                 (22). 
Equivalently:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
type type type type W p UC q UC qUC pUC σσ σ σ ≡+ − + − − + − (23). 
Unfolding (23) we get: 
(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
log (1 )log( )
(1 )
(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) log (1 )log( )
(1 )















σμ σ μ λ
σμ μ
σμ σ μ




⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −−− + −− ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ≡+ − +
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −−− + −− ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −+ − +
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠




(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
(1 ) log( ) (1 )log


















⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −−− + −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ +−
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −+ −
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −−− + −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
(24). 
Figure 2 shows W  for given return parameters. Note that W is decreasing both in σ and in the 
liquidity risk parameter γ . Marcella Lucchetta 
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Figure 2. The behavior of W as a function of σ  and liquidity risk γ  
 
Figure 2 shows that welfare decreases when market structure is concentrated and liquidity risk is high. 
The corner representing high levels of γ and  σ  can be viewed as a “crisis” realization with high 
welfare losses.  
When the interbank equilibrium does not exist, the autarkic allocation will prevail. Depositors’ 
expected utility under autarky is given by the solution of the following problem:  
12 ()( 1 )()
A MaxW U c U c
α μμ =+ −        (1b) 
Subject to  
  1 c μ αλ =        (2b) 
2 (1 ) (1 ) cR μ α − =− (3b). 
The optimal solution is 
* α μ = . Therefore, substituting in (2b) and (3b), the consumption 
allocations for each bank type at an autarkic equilibrium are:  
       ( )
(1) (2) ,
type type h CC R λ ==            (25a) 
   ( )
(3) (4) ,
type type l CC R λ ==        (25b). Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
11 
Correspondingly, the expected utility of an agent at the initial date is: 
[ log( ) (1 )log( )] (1 ) [ log( ) (1 )log( )]
(1 )(1 )[ log( ) (1 )log( )] (1 )[ log( ) (1 )log( )]
Al l h l l h
ll l l l l
Wp R q R
qR p R
σμ λ μ σγ μ λ γ μ
σμ λ μ σ γ μ λ λ μ
≡+ − + − + − +
− − +− + − +−
(26). 
Figure 3 shows W , the expected utility when the interbank equilibrium exists, and 
A W , the expected 
utility under autarky, as functions of σ  and γ  for two sets of economies. For high values of risk 
concentration and liquidity risk the interbank equilibrium does not exist, as 
A WW > . When the 
interbank surface lies over the autarky plane, the interbank equilibrium exists since 
A WW >  for all 
parameter values, with W  strictly decreasing in the degree of risk concentration σ . 
Figure 3. Behavior of W and 
A W  with different liquidity shocks 
 
Figure 3 illustrates a general finding summarized in the following proposition 3. The figure describes 
the existence of the interbank market and the welfare behavior for different levels of market structure 
and liquidity shocks. The corner with high liquidity shocks and high concentration is a crisis. In this 
case the interbank market will not exist since the autarky equilibrium (the plane W
A) gives higher 
welfare than the interbank equilibrium.  Marcella Lucchetta 
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Proposition 3.  
a.  There exists (,) σ γ such that 
A WW >  for all (,) (,) σ γσ γ > ; 
b.  When 
A WW > the interbank equilibrium exists, and W , is strictly decreasing in σ for any γ . 
It is useful to illustrate examples for different set of economies. Figure 4 clearly shows that when σ is 
high and liquidity risk, γ , is sufficiently high, the interbank allocation is dominated by the autarky 
allocation. 
Figure 4. W and 
A W  with relatively high  p  and q. 
 
Figure 5 shows that with high credit risk, i.e. low probability of realization of the high return, the 
interbank market is more likely to exist than the autarky allocation. This suggests that interbank 
markets insure against credit risk also, while W remains decreasing with respect to σ . Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
13 
Figure 5. W and 
A W  with relatively low  p  and q. 
 
The pictures 3, 4 and 5 highlight that welfare always decreases when the economy exhibits a high risks 
concentration and high liquidity exposure.  
VI. Endogenous Degree of Risk Concentration 
So far the degree of risk concentration in the banking system (parameter σ ) has been treated as 
exogenous. We have shown that welfare decreases in the degree of market concentration. For all 
examples shown, the highest depositors’ expected utility is reached at the minimum level of risk 
concentration ( 0 σ = ).  
Recall that σ  indexes probabilities as of date 0 . Therefore, a choice of σ  can be viewed as a 
bank choice of credit and liquidity risk. If achieving perfect diversification at a system level is 
costless, then in a perfectly competitive banking system, banks would choose the minimum level of 
risk concentration and the probability of interbank market breakdowns would be minimized. 
In reality, achieving diversification and controlling risk is costly, since risk control can be viewed 
as a technology available to firms, similar to the technology underlying credit risk models. The 
documented impact of increased risks among large financial institutions associated with increased 
concentration in market structure mentioned previously suggests that firms’ internal risk control 
systems are likely to be costlier. The potential for negative externalities is severe for larger an complex 
financial firms since the size and scope of their operations expands, financial firms’ span of control 
over their many units can become less effective.  Marcella Lucchetta 
14 
In this light, a lack of sufficient banking system diversification and a higher probability of 
interbank market breakdowns may be ultimately due to risk control diseconomies of scale and scope.  
The potential for first order effects of risk control diseconomies of scale and scope on risk 
concentration in the banking system, and their relationship with bank size, can be illustrated by the 
following modification of our model.  
Suppose at date 0  banks have a sizeS ≥ 0, and choose σ  employing part of date 0  resources. 
Specifically, they invest a fraction  x  of date resources in the technology and choose σ  incurring a 
cost  () zS
φ σ  as a fraction of date 0 resources, where  0 φ >  is the scale cost parameter. Their resource 
constraint at date 0  is therefore: 
() x zSS







=+ , with  0 a and  1 a  as positive coefficients. This function can be interpreted 
as a cost function of a risk control technology that exhibits decreasing returns to investment over a 
certain thresholds. Its parameters could depend on size and scope of financial firms operations, as well 
as on incentives arising from asymmetric information, market power and other factors pointed out in 
the literature, which may in turn be affected by firms’ size.  
To compute  () W σ , we replace 1 with  (1 ( ) ) Sz S
φ σ −  in the consumption allocations, 
 
1





=  (28) 
and  
2
(1 ) (1 ( ) )
1








Then, optimal borrowing/lending choices in the interbank market are:  
  ()
** (1 ( ) )





μ μα μ α λ
−
=− − − (30), 
With the liquidation choices α unchanged, the equilibrium in the interbank market is the solution of 
the following equation: 
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(1 )(1 ) (1 ( ) )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ( ) )(1 ) 0
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−− − − − − − − − =
(31), 
which yields 
  () * (1 )












Note that (32) is equivalent to (11), meaning that the equilibrium interbank rate does not depend on the 
function  (1 ( ) ) Sz S
φ σ − . This means that in the market for liquidity is the excess of demand on supply Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
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that determines interbank rate. Multiplying both demand and supply for the size function would not 
affect the equilibrium interbank rate. 
The consumption allocations for the four bank types which allow us to compute depositors’ 
expected utility are:  
 
(1) (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ( ) )





qp S z S
CR S z S
pq
φ
φ σμ σ μ λ σ
σ
σμ σ μ
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −−− + −− − ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ =−
⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
(33a) 
(2) (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ( ) )
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σμ σ μ
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −−− + −− − ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ =−
⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
(33b) 
  ( ) (3) (1 ) (1 ( ) )
(1 ( ) ),













⎜⎟ −−− + −− ⎝⎠
(33c) 
  ( ) (4) (1 ) (1 ( ) )
(1 ( ) ),













⎜⎟ −−− + −− ⎝⎠
(33d). 
Figure 6 shows (with different angles) an example of the expected utility function W as a function of 
σ  and the liquidity risk parameter γ . It is apparent that function W is strictly concave, with a 
maximum for σ  as an interior point. We plot the surface for size parameter S = 4and  1 φ = .  
Proposition 4. For any value of φ and for a given level of liquidity risk γ , the optimal bank risk 
concentration level 
* σ is increasing in S . 
Proposition 4 states that the scale parameter φ  is the determinant of the degree of diversification 
that a bank chooses, and bank diversification is inversely related to its assets size.  
Figure 6 shows the concavity property of the welfare function in the case of costly diversification. 
This implies the choice of a σ different from 0.  Marcella Lucchetta 
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Figure 6. Expected utility W  with costs of risk control  1 φ = and    S = 4. 
 
Figure 7 shows the optimal σ for different bank size. The maximum of the expected utility is different 
according to S . The concentration is greater for a bank size bigger than tone. While, for a small bank 
size, the concentration approaches zero.  Bank Market Structure, Systemic Risk, and Interbank Market Breakdowns 
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Figure 7. Expected utility W  for S =1and S = 4. 
 
Therefore, the optimal level of risk concentration might be larger than the minimum feasible. In turn, 
the concentration is larger for a greater bank size. The level of  0 a  and  1 a  may depend fundamentally 
on market structure, that is on the distribution of firms by size. As a result, any incentive to increase 
financial firms’ size, such as too-big-to-fail incentives, may carry higher risk control costs, which in 
turn could result in a higher level of risk concentration in the banking system.  
V. Conclusion 
Our model shows that the interaction of market structure and risk control diseconomies of scale seems 
of first order importance for the smooth functioning of interbank markets, as risk concentration 
increases in bank size. Our results are obtained in a model with no asymmetric information, no market 
power, no dysfunctional secondary markets or contracts’ incompleteness since deposit contracts are 
fully contingent. While incentives can be important in affecting bank managers’ choices of risk, the 
evidence reported by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) suggests that incentive effects are perhaps less 
important than previously thought. 
With regard to policy, the literature has prominently focused on the important role of the Central 
Bank as lender of last resort when interbank market breakdowns occur (see e.g. Freixas, Parigi and 
Rochet (2000), Repullo (2005), Goodhart and Illing (2002), Allen , Gale and Carletti (2009), and 
Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2009)). Our model suggests that the improvement of risk control 
technologies in large and complex financial institutions as well as in regulatory bodies may be as 
important to minimize the probability of interbank market breakdowns.  
 Marcella Lucchetta 
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Appendix 
Proposition 1. For the perfect diversified economy ( 0 σ = ) and for the perfect concentrated 
economy ( 1 σ = ), the set of interbank equilibriums is non-empty for any parameter configuration of 
credit and liquidity risk(,,,)
hlhl R R μμ . 
Proof: The left-hand side inequality of (12) can be expressed as: 
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
hl l h hl qp σ μ μ σ μσμ σμ μ −+ − ≤ −− + − − − + (A1),  
If 0 σ = , then                     (1 ) (1 )
hl l q μ μμ +− ≤ −                                  (A2) 
If 1 σ = , then                     0( 1 ) ( 1 )
hh l p μ μμ ≤− − − +                            (A3) 
The right-hand side inequality of (12) can be expressed as: 
(1 )( (1 )) [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )] [(1 ) ]
ll l





σ μμ σ μ σ μ σ μ μ −+ − ≥ − + − − − − + (A4) 
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μ μμ ≥− − − +                   (A6) 
Thus, the set of economies for which an interbank equilibrium exists is indexed by  [0,1] q∈  if 0 σ = , 
and by [0,1] p∈  if 1 σ = . 






































Inequality (A8) implies that(1 )( (1 )) (1 )(1 )
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  QED.  
Proposition 2. There exists a 
l μ such that for 
ll μ μ ≥ and any (, ) γ β  the set of interbank 
equilibrium under the diversified economy is always strictly larger than for the concentrated economy. 
Proof. Differentiating (18) with respect to
l μ , and evaluating the derivative at  1
l μ = : 
  ()
22 3 2 2
22
(1 ) 4 ( 1) ( 1 5 ) ( 1 7 8 )
(0, , )
(2 ) ( (1 ) 1 )
l G
μ
γβ γ β β γ β γ β β
γβ
γγ β γ
−+ ++ − − + +
−− −
  (A10), 
since (1 ) 0 γ −>and
22 (2 ) ( (1 ) 1 )0 γγ β γ − −− >, (A10) is positive if  
22 3 2 2 4(1 ) (1 5 ) (1 7 8 ) β γβ β γβ γ β β + + + > +++  (A11). 
Observe that for  1
l μ → ,  1 γ → , then (A11) reduces to  
  32 0 β + > (A12). 
Therefore, there exist values of 
l μ and  γ such that for 
ll μ μ ≥ and for γ γ ≥  the function 
(, ,)
l G μ γβ is increasing. QED 
Proposition 3. 
c.  There exists (,) σ γ such that 
A WW >  for all (,) (,) σ γσ γ > ; 
d.  When 
A WW > the interbank equilibrium exists, and W , is strictly decreasing in σ for any γ . 
Proof. We prove part a) and b) separately. 
a. There is a (,) (,) σ γσ γ > such that the autarky allocation dominates the interbank equilibrium.  
The expected utility under autarky for  0 σ = and for  1 σ =  are  
 
0 [ log( ) (1 )log( )] (1 )[ log( ) (1 )log( )]
Al l h l l l Wq R q R γμ λ γμ μ λ μ ≡+ − + −+ − (A13), 
and 
 
1 [ log( ) (1 )log( )] (1 )[ log( ) (1 )log( )]
Al lh l ll Wp R p R μλ μ γ μλ λ μ ≡+ −+ − + − (A14). Marcella Lucchetta 
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Hence, we compare the expected utility within a diversify economy between interbank allocation and 
autarky allocation 
{}
00 (1 )(1 )
log (1 )log( )
(1 ) log( ) (1 )log
(1 )(1 )


































−≡ + − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞



















+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
−− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
(A15), 
The difference of expected utility in a risk concentrated economy between the interbank allocation and 
autarky allocation is  
{}
11 (1 )(1 )
log (1 )log( )
(1 ) log( ) (1 )log
(1 )(1 )
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−− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
(A16). 






A WW − > , and 
11 0
A WW − < . Then, we conclude 
that there exist a couple (,) (,) σ γσ γ > such that the autarky allocation gives a higher expected utility 
than the interbank market equilibrium. 
b. When we have an interbank equilibrium, the expected utility decreases in σ . Take the derivative 











→→ − < ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
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Compute the derivative also for  0
l μ → , 
  () 1 00
l Wσ μ → →<  (A18). 
Therefore, as risk concentration increases, the expected utility in the interbank economy is decreasing. 
Moreover, the expected utility for  0 σ = and for  1 σ = are  
0 (1 )(1 )
log (1 )log( )
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(A19) 
and  
1 (1 )(1 )
log (1 )log( )





















≡+ − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞










log (1 ) log( ) (1 )log
(1 )(1 )















⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −−
+− +− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠


















l μ → , 
 
01 0 WW − → (A22). 
We conclude that for any γ the expected utility decreases in concentration, σ . QED 
Proposition 4. For any value of φ and for a given level of liquidity risk γ , the optimal bank risk 
concentration level 
* σ is increasing in S . 
Proof. Take the optimal 
* σ solving W for a given level of liquidity risk γ and for  0.5 pq == . For 
0 S → , we have that 
* 0 σ → and for  S → ∞
* 1 σ → . QED Marcella Lucchetta 
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